DePaul Journal of Health Care Law
Volume 5
Issue 2 Summer 2002

Article 8

November 2015

Case Note: Pegram v. Herdrich: HMO Physicians as Fiduciaries
Jamie Lynn Armitage

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl

Recommended Citation
Jamie L. Armitage, Case Note: Pegram v. Herdrich: HMO Physicians as Fiduciaries, 5 DePaul J. Health
Care L. 341 (2002)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol5/iss2/8

This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital
Commons@DePaul. It has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

CASE NOTE: PEGRAM V. HIERDRICH:
PHYSICIANS AS FIDUCIARIES

MO

Jamie Lynn Armitage

INTRODUCTION

A constant game of tug-of-war has waged since the implementation of
health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"): on one side of the rope
are the health maintenance organizations and physician subscribers
pulling to manage their organizations for their own financial benefit
free of fiduciary liability; on the other side of the rope are the patient
beneficiaries of the HMOs seeking to hold HMOs accountable.
However, the Supreme Court recently declared HMOs the winner. In
Pegram v. Herdrich' the Court found Carle Clinic Association, P.C.
("Carle"), a health maintenance organization, and its physician owners
had no fiduciary duty to its member patients.2
The Supreme Court's decision in Pegram has a devastating effect
on the country's health care system. HMOs provide healthcare
services, delivery, and financing into one prepaid capitated benefit
plan. 3 If patient beneficiaries are unable to hold HMOs responsible,
the
4
interest.
own
their
in
act
to
IMO providers will continue
1 Pegram
2id.

v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000).

3See generally Edward Korneich, Health Care M & A: Commercializationof

the MedicalIndustry, 741 PLI/COMM 329 (1996). See also Timothy S. Hall, ThirdParty Payer Conflicts ofInterest in Managed Care:A Proposalfor Regulation Based
on the Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct, 29 SETON HALL L. REv. 95, 103 (1998).

"[C]apitation [may be used] to tie the financial incentives of the physician directly to
the desired utilization rates." Id. "Under [this kind of contract], providers are paid a
fixed amount of money for each member of the plan." Id. "The provider is
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This article discusses Pegram and its consequences on the health
care system. First, this article looks at a brief history of liMOs. Second,
it explains the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of
1974 and its role in HMOs. Third, it looks at examples of state
legislative action regarding the role of fiduciaries and HMOs as
Congress toils with its answer. Fourth, this article explains the
procedural history of the Supreme Court decision of Pegram v.
Herdrich. Finally, this article looks at the impact of the Pegram on
patients who want redress for HMO physicians that are motivated by
their pocket books rather than patient healthcare.
BACKGROUND
History of HMliOs
Before HMOs
The primary goal of the managed care revolution in American health
care distribution and financing was to "eliminate unnecessary and
inappropriate care and to reduce costs associated with the traditional
fee-for-service model."5
Before HMOs, medical treatment was
administered through a fee-for-service model of payment. 6 As a patient
became ill and visited his or her physician payment was expected after
the visit.7 The physician would bill the patient for the services
rendered, and if the patient had insurance that was accepted by the
physician, the insurance would eventually pay for all or part of the
treatment. 8 If the patient had no health insurance, the patient would

contractually obligated to provide certain contractually defined services to the entire
patient population ....
" Id. "If the provider can provide those services for less cost
than the sum total of the capitation payments, it retains the excess as compensation
for services rendered." Id. "Ifthe provider cannot provide the designated services for
less than the capitation than the physicians may be held liable for the costs." Id. A
provider is a physician, both general practice and specialists. Id.
4Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216.
5
Gisela M. Munoz et al., Two Facesof Gag Provisions:PatientsandPhysicians
in a Bind, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 249, 250 (1998).
6Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218 (explaining that "[a] physician charges so much for a

physical
7 exam, a vaccination, a tonsillectomy, and so on.").
8

Id.
id.
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pay before leaving the office. Under "fee-for-service" health care, sick
patients were left with extremely expensive medical bills.
In order to control the cost of expensive medical treatment, HMOs
were created.9 In effect, under the fee-for-service model physicians
make money on sick people; whereas under HMOs, physicians benefit

from healthy patients who pay into the HMO but have no medical
bills.10 Since HMOs profit from healthy subscribers who pay the
member fees, HMOs provide ample preventive care."I
The IncreasingPopularityofHMOs
Managed care has become the primary means by which medical
treatment is administered in America today.' 2 In fact, from 1973 to
1987, the number of HMOs in existence grew from seventy-two to
more than seven hundred, and even more substantial was the growth of
the number of Americans covered
by HMOs which grew from 3.5
13
million.
twenty-nine
to
million
The HMO Act began under the Nixon Administration in 1973 as a
response to large increases in health care costs. 14 The Act was created
to cut costs, promote preventive care, and improve care." The first
IMOs emerged on the East and West coasts: Kaiser Permenente and
9Pegram, 530 U.S. at 218.
10

Id. at 219 (stating that the HMO assumes the financial risk of providing the

benefits promised by the HMO contract: if a patient never gets sick, the HMO keeps
the money, and if a patient becomes ill, the HMO is responsible for the treatment
agreed upon even if the treatment costs exceed the participant's premiums).
" Pegram, 530 U.S. at 219.
12 Hall, supra note 3, at 97. "In recent years, new stresses on the physicianclient relationship have been created by the advent of managed care systems.
Managed care attempts to realign the health care delivery system so that those who
are responsible for health care costs (physicians and other providers) have incentives
to take account of those costs in making treatment decisions. However, in removing
the traditional incentives for limitless health care spending without regard to cost,
managed care threatens to substitute a new, equally perverse incentive: the incentive
to provide too little care." Id.
13Hall, supra note 3, at 100.
14 RAND E. RosENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE

SYSTEM 549 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., The Foundation Press, Inc. 1977).
15 Jason A. Glodt, Watch OutHMOs: the Future ofPatientsRights will Soon be
Determined, 45 S.D. L. REV. 640 (2000).
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Group Health, respectively.' 6 These HMOs employed physicians and
employers and constructed hospitals. The enrollees paid a fixed
monthly fee, and in return gained access to the facilities and
professionals provided by the HMO.' 7 However, it was not until the
1980s that HMOs became increasingly popular due to several changes
to the HMO Act.1 8 The changes included incentives to recruit
Medicare and Medicaid recipients and allowed the emergence of forprofit HMOs. 19 The final increase in popularity came in the 1990's
after Clinton's effort to introduce a national health care plan in 1994
failed to gain support and the public rejected the government's health
care reform. 20 As a result, Americans turned to the managed care
organizations for health care.2 '
HMO Organization
HMOs are organized health care systems that finance and deliver a
broad range of comprehensive health care services to its members.
Originally, HMOs were financed through a prepaid fixed fee for the
appropriate utilization of health care resources and delivery of care for
22
the benefit of the patient and the health care system as a whole.
Functionally, an HMO is a combination of a health insurer and a
complete health care delivery system.23
In order to carry out the goal of increasing profits and minimizing
expenses, some HMOs have instituted cost containment procedures that
provide physicians financial incentives to curtail referrals to specialists
or non-HMO physicians, to reduce testing, and to choose the cheapest
form of treatment available.24 Primary care physicians are used as
16 JAMES C. DECHENE, HEALTH CARE REIMBURSEMENT AND DELIVERY
SYSTEMS, COURSE MATERIAL IN HEALTH CARE REIMBURSEMENT AND DELIVERY

SYSTEM, I-1, 1-4 (2000) (on file with author).

17 Id.
18 FOLLAND ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH & HEALTH CARE 303 (Jill

Lectka ed., Macmillan Publishing Co. 1993).
19.[d.

20

See Glodt, supranote 15, at 641.

21 id.

22Id.

23 id.

24 U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d. 589, 591 (1st Cir. 1993)
(stating that "HMOs often can provide healthcare at lower costs by stressing
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"gatekeepers" who monitor the care of the enrollees by approving or
disapproving the referral of care such as seeing specialists or the length
of the patients hospital stay.25 It is common for some HMO physicians
to deny referrals or fail to prescribe tests in order to preserve their yearend bonuses and capitation benefits.26 Some examples previously
litigated include: a baby suffering from injuries in childbirth after the
HMO denied the mother a much needed ultrasound because of a testing
policy 27 and a primary care physician whose patient died because he
dissuaded him from visiting a cardiologist in order to preserve the
Although courts have
physician's minimum referral reward. 28
sanctioned some cost reduction systems; courts have held that29they do
not have to be disclosed to patients unless they inquire directly.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
At the heart of the Pegram decision is that under the Supreme Court's
holding HMOs are not liable for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA,
thus closing the door for ERISA plan beneficiaries to hold HMO
physicians liable for their actions. 30 Simply put, physicians who work
for HMOs and who treat patients under ERISA plans are not currently
recognized as ERISA fiduciaries. Employers subscribe to HMOs for
regulates and provides
the benefit of their employees, and ERISA
31
remedies for employee welfare benefit plans.

preventative care, controlling costs and driving hard bargains with doctors or
hospitals" who often obtain more patients in exchange for a reduced charge). Id.
25 U.S. Healthcare,986 F.2d at 591.
26 James P. Duffy, Note, HMO Doctors as ERISA Fiduciaries:A Bankruptcy
Perspective, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 125, 129-30 (2000).
27 Kampmeier v. Sacred Heart Hosp., No. 95-7816, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5739 at *1-3 (E.D. Pa. May 1, 1996).
28 Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 626-628 (8th Cir. 1997).
29 Id. at 128-29. See also Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748,
755 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that there is no affirmative duty to disclose information
regarding financial incentive scheme).
30 Hall, supra note 3, at 114 (stating that ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on
of covered plans).
administrators
31
id.
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ERISA 's Purpose
ERISA is a federal statute that covers more than 160 million
Americans.32 It is a complex statutory scheme enacted in 1974 to
regulate and protect private employee benefit plans. 33 It includes both
pension and welfare plans. 34 A welfare plan is "any plan, fund or
program maintained for the purpose of providing medical or other
health benefits for employers or their beneficiaries through the
purchase of insurance or otherwise." 35 ERISA sets uniform standards
and rules relating to reporting disclosure and responsibility. 36 It creates
specific remedies for beneficiaries who suffer a breach of fiduciary
duty.37 Structurally, a plan qualifies as an employee benefit plan if it is
maintained pursuant to a written instrument which names a fiduciary,
outlines funding, administration, and procedures for amendments and
payments.
However, ERISA does not force employers to create
39
plans, or to maintain plan benefits at consistent levels.
Employee funded plans are generally established pursuant to
ERISA and are subject to a wide range of requirements under federal
law. 40 On the other hand, ERISA does not regulate those requirements
that are common under state law like coverage and coordination. 4 1 The
key distinction in determining whether state insurance laws can apply
to ERISA plans is whether benefits are provided through an insurance
policy purchased by the ERISA plan where the terms are subject to
regulation under state insurance laws, or are directly paid by the ERISA
plan that self insures where the benefits may not be subject to state
insurance regulation. 42

32

Glodt, supra note 15, at 642-43.
Duffy, supranote 26, at 132.
34
Id.at 133.
35
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994)).
36
Id.(citing Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990)).
37 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (1994).
38
1Id. at 133.
33

39 rd.
40

41

See DECHENE, supra note 16, at 1-26.
.id.

42id.
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ERISA 's Relevance to HMOs
ERISA claims against the administrator of benefits can be brought in
both state and federal court.43 However, an action may continue in
federal court even if an action is filed in state court.44 American
workers who participate in an employee paid HMO often cannot sue
their HMO for state law actions 5 such as bad faith claims against
insurance companies. As a result, an ERISA action to seek benefits will
46
almost always be removed to the federal court by the defendants.
One problem created by ERISA preempting almost all state laws is that
ERISA remedies are so limited that they strip beneficiaries of their
ability to get damages that they otherwise would receive under state
laws.47 In fact, courts generally conclude that remedies for recovery of
benefits under an ERISA-preempted health care plan are limited to
recovery of benefits owed and possibly reasonable attorney's fees.
Thus, damages such as consequential, punitive or emotional distress are
not recoverable. One commentator used the following example: if an
HMO denies a lung x-ray, and it is later established that the patient has
undetected lung cancer, the patient can only recover the cost of the xray, but cannot receive any
compensation for the damage caused by the
48
diagnosis.
delay in proper
State Legislative Action
Some states have taken their own legislative action on HMO liability.
For example, Texas was the first of many states that passed legislation
requiring an HMO to cover a hospital stay of at least two days, instead
of the usual one day, for certain procedures such as childbirth.4 9
Many states have legislative safeguards such as the automatic right
to appeal an HMO decision regarding a medical necessity of a
43

Munoz, et al., supra note 5, at 269.

44Id.
45

Some state actions will not be preempted by ERISA.
46
Munoz, et al., supra note 5, at 269.
47
Id.

48 Id

"Id.

49 Jack E. Karns, LitigatingAround ERISA to Quality ManagedHealthcare:An

HMO Can Breach Fiduciary Duties, 79 NEB. L. REV. 149, 167 (2000) (citing
Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 12 F. Supp. 2d 597, 602-03 (S.D.
Tex. 1998).
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particular treatment. 50 However, this may create more problems than it
helps since it creates another layer of bureaucracy in choosing qualified
mediators and arbitrators to establish a review mechanism. 51 Some
scholars fear that state legislatures will start passing bills that guarantee
a patient's right to sue an HMO, fearing the return to the days of
patients paying for each treatment and fewer people with the ability to
afford medical care.52 State legislatures are walking a fine line between
regulating the industry to5 3benefit the patients and meddling in the
private industry of HMOs.
Procedural History of Pegram v. Herdrich
Facts
Cynthia Herdrich suffered a ruptured appendix after her HMOs
physician ordered her to wait eight days so she could schedule an HMO
clinic. 54 Herdrich's health care provider consisted of three different
entities which operated together to form a pre-paid health insurance
55
plan that provides medical and hospital services to beneficiaries.
Herdrich was covered under a plan subscription through her husband's
employer, State Farm Insurance Company. 56 Herdrich's physician,7
Lori Pegram, was a physician who contracted under the Carle plan.5
Herdrich started having pain in the midline area of her groin. 8 On
March 1, 1991, while Dr. Pegram treated Herdrich, she acknowledged
the pain Herdrich was experiencing, but took no further action.5 9 Six
days later, Herdrich returned to the doctor. and Dr. Pegram felt a six-byeight centimeter inflamed mass in Herdrich's abdomen. 60 Despite the
inflammation, Dr. Pegram did not immediately order an ultrasound at a
local hospital in Bloomington, Illinois. Rather, Hercrich was forced to
50
5

Karns, supra note 49, 167-68.
'Id. at 169.

52

t.d.
Id. at 169-70.

53

54

Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 1998).

55 1d.
56 id.
57id.
58
59
60

Pegram, 530 U.S. 215.
Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365.
1d.
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wait eight more days 61 for the necessary ultrasound to be performed at
a facility staffed by Carle physicians more than 50 miles away. 62
Before Herdrich could make it to the ultrasound at the Carle facility,
her appendix ruptured and she suffered from peritonitis. 63 When
Herdrich discovered her HMO paid bonuses to doctors who ordered
fewer diagnostic tests, she sued Dr. Pegram and the HMO in state court
for state medical malpractice and fraud.64
The District Court

In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois,
Defendants responded that ERISA preempted the state fraud counts and
removed the matter to federal court.65 In federal court, Herdrich
amended her complaint to include a claim alleging that a provision of
medical services under the terms of the Carle IHM that rewarded its
physician owners for limiting medical care was an inherent
participatory breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty.66 The claim alleged
that the provision breached the contract because it created an incentive
for physicians to make decisions for their own financial
interest, rather
67
health.
beneficiaries'
plan
the
of
interest
than in the

61 Herdrich's medical expert stated that Herdrich's condition worsened during
the eight-day waiting period "because obviously there has been another week of that
appendix
62 becoming necrotic and sitting in the pus .... "Id. at 374.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.
63
Id. Peritonitis is the inflammation of the peritoneum, which is the membrane
that lines the walls of the abdominal cavity.
6 Id. Herdrich asserted that Carle violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act,
815 ILCS 505/1 et seq., "by failing to disclose certain material facts regarding the
ownership of Health Alliance Medical Plans ('HAMP"), and failing to advise her that
compensation of plan physicians was increased to the extent that they did not order
diagnostic tests, utilized facilities owned by those physicians, and did not make
emergency or consultation referrals." Herdrich also alleged that HAWP breached its
duty of good faith and fair dealing by increasing its profits and the profits of its
contracted physicians to the detriment of plan beneficiaries. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at
366 n.2.
65
Id. See Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §
1001-1461, preempted counts I and IV of state law fraud against Carle and
successfully removed the case to federal court.
66 Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365.
67
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216.
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The trial judge granted the summary motion on the state law fraud
count and gave Herdrich leave to amend to clearly set forth her ERISA
claim for breach of fiduciary duty.68 The court later dismissed the
count alleging that defendants breached their fiduciary duties in
violation of ERISA.69 Herdrich then appealed the dismissal of the
ERISA count to the Seventh Circuit.70
The Seventh Circuit
Three issues were considered by the United States Court of Appeals:
first, whether the district court wrongly dismissed Herdrich's claim of a
breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA; second, whether the Seventh
Circuit had jurisdiction to hear the case due to Herdrich's failure to file
a timely notice of appeal from the order of dismissal; and finally, the
court looked at defendant's argument that Herdrich's request for
damages is inappropriate insofar as beneficiaries under an ERISA
benefits plan may not recover
'anything other than the benefits
71
provided expressly in the plan.'
The court found that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case since
Herdrich's appeal from the trial court was not timely filed. 72 The court
also held that Herdrich properly stated a claim under ERISA.73
Furthermore, the court stated Herdrich's pleading properly stated a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, since the facts set
forth that: (1) the defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) the defendants
breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) a cognizable loss resulted, 74

68

69

Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 366.
Id. The court granted Summary judgment against Herdrich on count IV "to

the extent she relies on § 502(a)(3)(B) [of ERISA] as a basis for monetary relief, as
opposed to equitable relief," and that provision does not provide for extra-contractual
damages.
70 Id.

Id. at 367.

71

1d.

Id. at 367-68. Herdrich did not file within thirty days of the December 5tl
entry ofjudgment. Id.
73
Id. at 369.
74
Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 369.
72
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The court disagreed with the district court as to whether there was
a failure to allege defendants were fiduciaries. 75 The court held that
Congress intended the definition of fiduciary to be interpreted
broadly.76 The court found that the "defendant physicians managed the
plan, including the doctor referral process, the nature and duration of
patient care. ' 77 Also, the board of directors consisted exclusively of the
plan physicians who were "in control of each and every aspect of the
78
HMOs governance, including their own year-end bonuses."
Furthermore, the court found that this level of "control satisfies
ERISA's requirement that a fiduciary maintain discretionary control
and authority." 79 As a result the court found the defendant to be a plan
fiduciary.
The court went on to find that there was a breach of fiduciary
duty, 80 and that a fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duty of care
whenever he or she acts to benefit his or her own interests. 81 Drawing
parallels to other cases, the court found intricacies of the defendant's82
incentive structure were to benefit the defendant's own interests.
Hence, the same HMO administrators with the authority to determine
whether health care claims would be paid, and the type, nature, and
duration of care to be given, were those physicians who became
eligible to receive year-end bonuses. The bonuses were based on the
difference between total plan costs and gave an incentive to limit
75 Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 369. It is interesting to note that Herdrich originally
maintained that the defendants were not plan fiduciaries and defendants insisted that
they were.
Id.
76
Id.at 370.
77
id.
78
Herdich, 154 F.3d at 370.
79

id.

'oId. at 371. "[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and-(A) for the exclusive
purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii)

defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill,
prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man
acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an
enterprise of a like character and with like aims ...." Id. at 371 (citing 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1) (1994).
81 Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 371 (citing James F. Forden et al., Handbook on
ERISA82Litigation Sec. 3.03[A], at 3-53 (1994)).

Herdich, 154 F.3d at 372.
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treatment to receive larger bonuses.8 3 With a focus on year-end
bonuses, it is not unrealistic to assume that the doctors prescribing care
under the plan are bias.84 The court was clear in holding that the
decision does not make a bright line rule that where there are
incentives, there is a breach of fiduciary duty; rather, incentives can be
a breach of fiduciary duty where the fiduciary trust between plan
participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exist. 85 Furthermore, the
court responding to criticism by the dissent, clarifies that this decision
does not mean that a fiduciary cannot have dual loyalties.86 Instead, the
court says, "that tolerance has its limits" and does not extend to a
situation like this "where a fiduciary jettisons his responsibility to the
physical well being of beneficiaries in favor of loyalty to his own
financial interests. 87
The court justified its decision by the policy that health care critics
across the country are complaining about the quality of medical
treatment that is declining because "the goal of managing care has been
replaced by the goal of managing costs." 88 The court reasoned that
since sixty percent of all managed care plans, including HMOs and
preferred provider organizations, now pay their primary care doctors
through some sort of capitation system, 89 and there is an "urgency
to
9°
address the issue and hold HIMOs responsible as fiduciaries.
In summary, the Seventh Circuit noted that because the
physician's year-end bonuses were based on the difference between
total plan costs and revenues, an incentive existed for them to limit
treatment, thereby ensuring larger bonuses. 91 The court concluded that
83 rd.
8
4Herdich, 154 F.3d
8

5Id. at 373.

86
87

at 372.

Td.
Id.

Id. at 375 (citing Jan Greene, Has Managed Care Lost Its Soul? Health
Maintenance Organizations Focus More on Finances, Less on Care, AM. HOSP.
PUBLISHING
INC., May 20, 1997).
89
Herdrich, 154 F.3d 376.
88

90

Id.

91

Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372. In Herdrich's complaint she argued: "Because

the physician/administrators' year end bonuses were based on the difference between
total plan costs and revenues, an incentive existed for them to limit treatment and, in
turn, HMO costs so as to ensure larger bonuses." Id.
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incentives can rise to the level of a breach where the fiduciary trust
between plan and participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exist. 92
The court acknowledged that ERISA allows any plan beneficiary to sue
for breach of fiduciary duty, and a fiduciary breaches his or her duty 93
of
care whenever he or she acts to the benefit of his or her own interests.
The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Seventh Circuit
opinion holding that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by
a IHIMO, acting through
it physicians, were not fiduciary acts within the
94
ERISA.
of
meaning
The Supreme Court fell short of the Seventh Circuit analysis to
determine whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty because the
Court stopped the analysis after deciding that HMOs do not fall within
the classification of a fiduciary under ERISA. 95 The Court found that
regardless of the HMO, there must be some treatment rationing and
inducement to ration treatment. 96 The Court stated that holding HMOs
as ERISA fiduciaries would be too broad because all HMOs acting
through their owner or employee physicians would have to be judged
by the same standards and subject to the same claims. 97 The Supreme
Court admitted that the relationship between withholding medical
treatment and the incentive for financial award is not a subtle one.
However, the Court argued that no HMO organization could survive
without some
incentive connecting physician rewards with treatment
9
rationing. 8
Furthermore, the Court found that a fiduciary may have dual
loyalties as long as the fiduciary "wear[s] only one [hat] at a time, and
wear[s] the fiduciary hat when making a fiduciary decision." 99 The
Court held that "the specific payout of the plan was... a feature that the
employer, as plan sponsor, had no fiduciary duty under ERISA, since
92

Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372.

9 Id.
(citing
94

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1974)).
Pegram, 530 U.S. 211, 214.
9'Id. at 230.
96Id.
at 221.
97
Id.at 222.

9'Id. at 220.
" Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.

DEPAUL JouRNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5:341

an employer's decisions about the content of a plan are not themselves
fiduciary acts." 100 The Court found that the situation is akin to every
administrative decision where a physician makes judgments about
reasonable medical treatment, since making eligibility decisions and
treatment decisions are inextricably mixed. 10 Therefore, there was no
ERISA violation when the incorporators of Carle HMO provided for
the year-end payout since the decision was administrative.102
The Court determined that the issue of whether IHMOs are held as
fiduciaries was not a judicial decision, but rather a Congressional
decision: "If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of IMO practice
to certain preferred forms, it may choose to do so." 10 3 The Court
determined that HIOs came into existence because of groups of
physicians were consistently providing more medical treatment than
necessary. 104 The Court stated that it would be too easy to allege an
economic influence seemingly adverse to the patient whenever an
outcome was not a good10 5one, and feared this would makes HMOs a
"guarantor of recovery."'
Finally, the Court found the Seventh Circuit's holding of fiduciary
breaches limited to situations where the sole purpose of delaying or
withholding treatment was to increase the physician's financial reward
was problematic.106 The first problem the court had with the limited
holding was that the "tactical" defense I-IMO physicians would use
would be that he or she was not acting for his or her financial interest
but for good medical reasons.107 This defense would require reference
to standards of reasonable and customary medical practice in like
circumstances, 0 8 and would play out in court as a malpractice action.

I00Pegram, 530 U.S. at 226.

101

Id. at 229.

1021d
10

3 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 233-34.

104 id.

'05 Id. at 233-34.

'06 Id. at 235.
0

1 7 Pegram, 530 U.S.

108 d.

at 235.
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ANALYSIS
HMO Physicians as Fiduciaries
In Pegram the Court determined that HMO physicians are not
fiduciaries to beneficiaries, 109 despite the overwhelming similarities
that IMO physicians have to other legally recognized fiduciaries. This
decision is alarming to patients who are now left with no redress for the
actions of HMOs. The Court refused to hold 1HMG physicians as
fiduciaries despite the fact that 1MG owner physicians not only fall
under the standard definition of fiduciary, the 1MO-beneficiary
relationship resembles other fiduciary relationships, and HMO
physicians fall within Congress' statutory definition of fiduciary under
ERISA.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines fiduciary as, "one who owes to
another a duty of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor." 110 Patients
expect "good faith, trust, confidence and candor" in their physician. If
a physician is being persuaded or influenced by an HMO plan then
patients expect the same standards from the IMO physicians.
Furthermore, a fiduciary relationship is a "relationship that exists when
one person is under a duty to act for the benefit of the other on matters
within the scope of the relationship.""'
Fiduciary relationships arise
in one of four situations: (1) when one person places trust in the faithful
integrity of another, who as a result gains superiority or influences over
the first; (2) when one person assumes control and responsibility over
another; (3) when one person has a duty to act for or give advice to
another on matters falling within the scope of the relationship; or (4)
when there is a specific relationship that has traditionally been
recognized as involving fiduciary duties." 2 An HMO and physician
most notably fall under the third category because the physicians has a
duty to act for or give advice to another on matters falling within the
scope of the 1MO plan that creates the relationship and they are acting
as an agent for the 11MO. In fact, the contractual relationship gives
o9 Pegram, 530 U.S. at 216.
0BLACKS LAW DIcTIONARY 625-26 (6th ed. 1999).

1

111
Id.
112 See In re Estate of Heilinan, 345 N.E.2d 536, 540 (111. App. Ct. 1976).
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color to the argument that the HMO and physician have a fiduciary
relationship with the beneficiary under the second category listed
above. Contractually, physicians assume control and responsibility
over all heath care decisions and treatments for the beneficiaries of the
HMO. Finally, the relationship also fits under the fourth category since
the HMO physician-beneficiary relationship is analogous to other
fiduciary relationships recognized by law. Some examples of those
relationships traditionally recognized as having a fiduciary duty are
trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, agent-principal, and attorney-client.
Trustee-Beneficiary
The trustee-beneficiary interest is similar to HMO physicianbeneficiary because the superior authority whether by possession of
money or knowledge has complete or at least partial control over the
interests of the beneficiary. Just as the trustee must make decisions that
directly affect the beneficiary, the decisions that the physician makes in
regard to the HMO plan have a direct impact on the health and well
being of the patient beneficiary. However, in an HMO-patient
relationship the beneficiary also benefits from the HMO in that they
pay a low fee for unlimited amount of treatment. Nonetheless, if the
patient does not get sick the employer still pays the same premium. In
Pegram, the Court says the analogy between the ERISA fiduciary and
common law trustee becomes problematic because, "the trustee at
common law characteristically wears only his fiduciary hat when he
takes action to effect the beneficiary, whereas the trustee under ERISA
may wear different hats."' 113 The Court further says that trustees, unlike
HMO physicians, would violate their duty if they placed themselves in
a position that would be for his own benefit.1 14 However, Dr. Pegram
was wearing her "fiduciary hat" when she ordered Herdrich to wait
eight days before traveling to a far away HMO clinic. 115 In fact,
Pegram was wearing her "fiduciary hat" as soon as Herdrich stepped
into her medical office for an evaluation of her ailment. Also,
Herdrich's claim is toward the Carle HMO as a whole 116 and not
113

Pegram,530 U.S. at 225.

114Id
115

rd

16I.at

.

216.
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against Dr. Pegram for failing to make a prudent decision. Dr. Pegram
was acting as the decision maker and was the one that scheduled the
ultrasound a full eight days after noticing the mass. 1 7 There was no one
above Dr. Pegram that made these decisions. Dr. Pegram was the plan
manager and should be personally responsible along with the Carle
HMO.
Likewise, having a personal interest in an agreement or
relationship is quite different than acting for one's own interest once in
that relationship. In order for a relationship to be successful neither one
of the parties can be self-serving. Thus, although physicians in HMOs
can have a financial interest in entering into an HMO, they should not
have to choose between care for their patients and their own financial
benefit. To do so would be devastating to the millions of patients that
are at the mercy of these HMO physicians.
Guardian-Ward
The guardian-ward relationship parallels the HMO physicianbeneficiary relationship, and serves a compelling reason that IHMOs
should be ERISA fiduciaries. A ward is a minor who is under a
guardian's charge or protection or "placed under the care and
supervision of a guardian or conservator."' " Similarly, a patient is like
a minor because the patient does not have the skill or expertise that the
physician has in making treatment decisions. There is such a strong
dependency from the minor to the guardian that the guardian is a
"protector." Physicians, too, should protect their patients because there
is a strong dependency from the patient to the physician. HMO
physicians should have a fiduciary duty to use their expertise to protect
patients from incurring preventable diseases like the Peritosis Cynthia
Herdrich developed.
Agent-Principal
The agent-principal relationship, which has long been recognized as a
fiduciary relationship, also has many characteristics of an HMO

117 Pegram, 530

U.S. at 215.

"8 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 109, at 1583.
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physician-beneficiary relationship.1 19 A principal authorizes another to
act on his or her behalf as an agent, but the principal has primary
responsibility on the obligation. Agency is a legal concept which
depends upon the existence of three elements: (1) the manifestation by
the principal that the agent shall act for him; (2) the agent's acceptance
of the undertaking; and (3) the understanding of the parties that the
principal is to be in control of the undertaking.12 0 The intent of the
parties does not in itself create the agency.' 21 There are similarities
between an agent- principal relationship and a HMO-physician
relationship. The HMO contracts with the physician to ensure the
physician will be the one performing the medical services for the HMO
in return for payment. Thus, the HMO, as principal, manifests that the
physician will act for it, and the physician agrees by signing the
contract. The HMO and physician agree that the HMO plan will dictate
the relationship with the patient and the treatment given. In an agentprincipal relationship, the principal is held responsible for the agent's
action. Since the HMO and physician meet the criteria of an agentprincipal relationship, the HMO should be liable for the physician's
actions.
Attorney-Client
Also, the HMO physician and beneficiary relationship is like the
attorney-client relationship. The attorney-client relationship is fiduciary
as a matter of law. 122 This is because of the high standards lawyers are
held to, such as zealous advocacy, competency and confidentiality. 23
The medical profession is held to similar standards. In order to sanctify
and preserve the profession, physicians should be held to the utmost
duty of care and loyalty that is inherent in the fiduciary duty.
Therefore, physicians (acting through their HMOs) should be held
accountable, just as attorneys are held to the Model Rules of
19 See Morris Oil Co. v. Rainbow Oilfield Trucking, Inc., 741 P.2d 840 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1987).
20
' See id.
121See id.
122 See James Coomes, The Scope of Lawyer Liability to Limited Partners
Arising Out of a General Partner'sBreach of FiduciaryDuty, 22 J. LEGAL PROF.
231, 232 (1998).
'

Id.
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Professional Conduct.1 24 In fact, some scholars suggest that HMO
physicians should be held to the same standard as attorneys in the
situation of third party payers.1 25 "If a third party pays for legal
services rendered to another, the lawyer is only allowed to accept the
representation on these terms if the client consents after full disclosure
and if the lawyer reasonably believes that the third party payer will not
126
affect the lawyer's professional judgment on behalf of the client."
"If the disinterested lawyer would not believe that the latter
requirement is satisfied, the lawyer is ethically prohibited from
accepting the representation on the terms offered, even if the client,
after full disclosure of the conflict of interest, is willing to accept
representation on those terms."' 127 Similarly, if a physician reasonably
believes that receiving a year-end bonus or other HMO compensation
will effect his treatment decisions for his patient, he should not accept
the bonus or the patient. Physicians in HMOs should be held
accountable to the plan that patient beneficiaries believe they have
entered into, one that will
protect the patient, not offer financial
28
incentives to physicians.1
The Physician'sFiduciaryDuty
A physician is held to a strict fiduciary duty to his beneficiary
patients.1 9 There are at least three reasons why a physician has this
duty: first, the relationship between a doctor and patient has long been
124 Hall, supra note
"5 Id. at 96-97.

26 Id.at
127 Id.
128 Id. at

3 at 96.

97.
98. "This article proposes that such a rule be applied to physicians

entering into contractual relationships with managed care organizations." Hall, supra
note 3, at 98." Such a rule would benefit physicians and patients." Id. "It would
recognize first, that the principle of freedom of contract does not apply well to
patient-physician relationships, because of the imbalance of expertise, necessity of
trust in the physician, and the nature of managed care contracts as adhesion
contracts." Id. Second, it would restore the physician to the position of protector of
the patient's best interest. Id. "The physician would have an affirmative ethical
obligation not to enter into managed care relationships in which a disinterested
physician would not agree that the inherent conflicts of interest can be resolved in
harmony
1 with the best interests of the patients." Id.
29 Munoz et al., supra note 5, at 258.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

[Vol. 5: 341

recognized as a contractual relationship; second, under tort law a doctor
is liable for medical malpractice if he or she fails to provide the care of
a reasonable physician in like circumstances; and third, law recognizes
the fiduciary relationship because the doctor is a voluntary undertaker
acting for the patients benefit. 130 Many physicians now are HMO
providers. Therefore, just as the above reasoning for physician's
fiduciary status, the HMO now serves as the fiduciary. Thus, the three
situational relationships that create a duty between physicians and their
patients, contract, tort law, and voluntary undertaking, should be passed
on to the HMO. The fiduciary duty should be passed on through
contract because many patients and their employers now contract with
the HMOs rather than the physicians directly. The relationship from
physicians to patients should be identical to the HMO-patient
relationship in tort law because the HMOs influence the member
physician's decisions in providing patient care. For example, Dr.
Pegram did not order an immediate ultrasound at the local hospital
because if she waited for the Carle facility she would contribute to her
year-end bonus; therefore, the IMO motivated her decision to delay
treatment. Finally, the presumption that the physician possesses
superior knowledge of medical diagnosis and services should likewise
apply to HiOs because HMOs set the parameters for which the
physicians base their treatment decisions.
Congress Andcipated HMOs under EPJSA
The statutory definition of ERISA fiduciary drafted by Congress allows
HMOs to be held as fiduciaries. HIMOs are not mentioned because
HMOs did not exist in the statutory language when ERISA was
established in 1974, but under ERISA Congress could have anticipated
something like an HMO to fall under the statutory definition of a
fiduciary for the following reasons.
The Supreme Court in Pegram states, "The question is whether
that person was performing a fiduciary function when taking the action
subject to the complaint and not whether the actions were adverse to
the beneficiary."' 131 The Court says that this is because "Congress was

"OId.
at 262-263.
31
Pegram,530 U.S. at 226.
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unlikely to have thought of these decisions as fiduciaries." 132 However,
Congress delineates the definition of a fiduciary in ERISA, and HMO
physician's decisions fit the definition. Under ERISA, "A fiduciary is
someone acting in the capacity of manager, administrator, or financial
adviser to a plan." 133 Dr. Pegram was the administrator of the Carle
plan. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "manager" as "one
who directs, controls or handles." 134 Dr. Pegram controlled the doctor
appointment by examining the patient and by further directing the
patient to wait eight days before getting further tests at a far away
hospital owned by Carle. 135 Also, an "administrator" is defined as
"someone who manages business affairs.' 136 Arguably, Dr. Pegram
was "managing the affairs" of the HMO in the interest of Dr. Pegram
and other owners of Carle's financial benefit and plan when she made
the management decision to wait the eight days for further testing at a
Carle facility. 137
An "advisor" is "one who recommends or
suggests. ' ' 138
Dr. Pegram acted as an "advisor" because she
recommended that Herdrich wait eight days to get tested at the Carleowned hospital located forty-five minutes away. 139 Herdrich followed
what her doctor recommended like most patients that rely on their
physician's knowledge and expertise. 140
The Circuit Court itself
defined "plan" as a "scheme decided on in advance. ' 141 The Carle
HMOs scheme was142to encourage frugal treatment in order to receive
the year-end bonus.
The Seventh Circuit's Test
Furthermore, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's test that
there is a breach of fiduciary where the sole purpose of delaying
112 Id.at 231.
133

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1994).

134THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
35

1

Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.

504 (3rd ed. 1999).

136 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 209, at 11.
131
See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215. See also Herdirich,at 362, 365 n.1.
138 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY,
139

See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 215.

140

id.

14 1Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 369.
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Id.at 372.

supra note 209, at 13.
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treatment is for a financial award.1 43 The Seventh Circuit felt
comfortable with implementing this distinction, stating it best by
saying: "With a jaundiced eye focused firmly on year-end bonuses, it is
not unrealistic to assume that the doctors rendering care under the plan
were swayed to be most frugal when excising their discretionary
authority to the detriment of their membership." 144 A physician who
finds an abdominal mass and waits eight days to provide the proper test
at an HMO provider hospital to receive a year-end bonus is not acting
in their patient's best interest. Rather, the physician is fulfilling the
plan's objectives while also lining his own pockets.
The Supreme Court strayed far from the Seventh Circuit's
majority and dissenting opinions in declaring that HMOs can never rise
to the breach of a fiduciary duty. 145 The unanimous opinion written by
Justice Souter stated by declaring the Carle LIMO had breached its duty
of loyalty and trust to the participating patients because of the purely
financial incentive of delaying the treatment of Herdrich's appendix
opens the door to declaring this breach on all HMOs. 146 Since all
HMOs have some sort of financial incentive involved, "inducement to
ration care is the very point of any HMO scheme, and rationing
necessarily raises some risks while reducing others."' 147 The Court
found that making a distinction between good and bad HMOs would
embody a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk that would
turn on facts not readily accessible to courts. 148
However,
distinguishing between good and bad HMOs is easily discernable. The
nine Supreme Court Justices are not medical doctors educated and
14

sPegram, 530 U.S. at 234-35.

'44 Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 372.
The court sets out the intricacies of the
defendants' incentive structure set forth in their claim. Id. "The plan dictated that the
very same HMO administrators vested with the authority to determine whether health
care claims would be paid, and the type, nature, and duration of care to be given, were
those physicians were those physicians who became eligible to receive year-end
bonuses were based on the difference between total costs (i.e., the costs of providing
medical services) and revenues (i.e. the costs of providing medical services) and
revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), and incentive existed for them to limit
treatments
and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure larger bonuses." Id.
145
See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 236-37.

146 Id.
147

148.

Id.at 221.
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skilled in determining diagnoses or determining when and how to
effectively treat patients; yet, the Court only had to determine whether
the physician allowed his or her judgment to be affected by his desire
for a larger bonus. A logical test to use to answer the question would
be a reasonable physician standard. If a reasonable physician treating
the same symptom would prescribe a treatment at a specific time and
place, the failure to do so would be inherently suspect in situations in
which the physician is on a incentive plan like in Pegram.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court declared IMO physicians the winners of the tugof-war in Pegram, and found that HMO physicians were not
fiduciaries. However, HMO physicians fall under the definition of
fiduciaries to their patients, and therefore should be held accountable to
HMO beneficiaries. The Court in numerous relationships similar to the
HMO physician and beneficiary relationship such as guardian-ward,
attorney-client, trustee-beneficiary, etc. has confirmed a fiduciary
relationship. Rather than a comparative analysis, the Court made
generalizations about HMOs as a whole, and stopped short of
distinguishing those HMOs that should be held as fiduciaries and are
motivated by financial incentives from those that are not. Some HMOs
deserve less protection from liability than others. For example, an
HMIO that gives year-end bonuses for withholding treatment that a
reasonable physician would prescribe in similar circumstances should
be held as a fiduciary. It is only when the Court allows HMOs to be
held to the high fiduciary standard as non-HMO physicians that
patients will feel safe with their liMO-physicians treatment decisions.
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